Castles in the Sky: Canada's NATO Defence Commitment: Skepticism and Challenges Ahead

'Castles in the sky' is an idiom that refers to the unlikelihood that something will happen, an expression of unrealistic or impossible expectations.

Canada has (begrudgingly) committed to actually meet NATO’s 2% of GDP defence spending target. I suspected that the government could no longer withstand the scrutiny and criticism and this decision was unquestionably made under duress. Notwithstanding this significant development, this is far from over. The announcement - as much as I’m sure it pained the Prime Minster - was actually the easy part. There are a however several reasons why I remain skeptical and have little confidence that this commitment will actually be honoured… certainly not by this government.

SKEPTICISM

Firstly, most of the spending is well beyond the mandate of this government and must therefore actually be formally budgeted by any future government. Given the enormous pressures created by 9 years of fiscal mismanagement, I think this it is an extremely risky assumption to think that such a spending commitment will actually be affordable. This is basically a poisoned chalice for the next government as they will need to rationalize the compelling need to deliver on the defence spending target while also wanting to put the fiscal situation back on an even keel.

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Secondly, the proposed spending is underpinned by both political reluctance and a systemic bias against actually spending the funds allocated to defence. Apparently, the unspent or re-profiled “defence” funds over the past 9 years is in the order of $14B. Some of this might have been intentional in order to balance the books; much of it is likely a simple function of systemic incompetence or lack of capacity. Whatever the explanation, such a record does not bode well for achieving the levels of spending required to meet the 2% target. Beyond that, the “plan” as presented is woefully lacking in detail and realism.

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Thirdly, the practical challenges of actually delivering, staffing, and sustaining the new capabilities are staggering. If we look only at the naval component of the problem, that alone should dispel any misguided notions of optimism. With apologies to my parent service, I’m simply using the RCN “problem space” to illustrate some of the real impediments to achieving the expressed ambition. These challenges unquestionably apply to broader CAF/DND as well.

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Let’s start with affordability. Perhaps it could be argued, that if your objective is to merely achieve a spending target, affordability might not be a consideration. In that context, the goal would be to simply spend as much as possible. This would be entirely irresponsible and not in the best interest of the taxpayer. So, lets assume that affordability therefore is a legitimate consideration; and, that we need to consider the entire life-cycle of a capability, not just its initial acquisition. One of challenges is determining how to define affordability. In this context however, it would be reasonable to ask, how much of the available (increased) funding should be allocated to which set(s) of capabilities. Following that, a subsequent question might be, how much of the overall program would be allocated to naval capabilities for example. None of these questions are easily answered, but not doing so severely compromises the integrity of any plan.

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Achievability, or the ability to actually decide, design, and acquire the requisite capabilities might be the next concern. We are now over 15 years into approved discussions about the Canadian Surface Combatant. To date we still don’t have an approved design, a final cost, or an actual contract to build any ships. Yes, we have had an announcement about a test module, but that PR stunt hardly counts as substantive progress. The recent, and much needed, addition of “up to 12” submarines into the mix, is yet another complication to the RCN’s strategic problem. Its encouraging to hear mention of needing to accelerate the timeline to avoid a gap, and that new boats should be more capable and reliable. Sadly however, we heard these same arguments about 20 years ago when we wasted a decade trying to decide whether to buy the used “interim” boats we have today. The point being that I’m not convinced we are actually capable of achieving everything that is required without fundamental changes to how we behave.

PERSONNEL

Now we must address the elephant in the room; where are all the people going to come from to crew, maintain and support all these ships and submarines? Of all the challenges facing the institution, this to me is the most concerning. I genuinely applaud the innovative efforts to try and implement unorthodox ideas such as the Naval Experience Program, but those gains are minimal and cannot address the massive shortfalls of qualified sailors. Some might argue that there is no point building state of the art fleets that require thousands of people that don’t exist. I would offer in response the Field of Dreams line that “if you build it they will come”. I contend that quality people will be drawn to an organization that is properly funded, equipped and supported by the nation it serves.

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I was recently asked “is any of this actually feasible”. The better question to ask is “given the current state of the CAF, DND and broader machinery of government, what needs to be done to make this feasible”? It is critical; both to be able to responsibly achieve our intended NATO spending target; and, also to fundamentally rebuild the CAF in order to meet the rapidly degrading global security environment. If we don’t figure this out, we will not have any reasonable chance of achieving either of these strategic imperatives.